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v i i 
ON A FORMAL TREATMENT 
OF ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE 
INDICATORS 
Dietmar Z a e f f e r e r 
0. I n t r o d u c t i o n 
What I am going to present here on the t o p i c of a formal treatment 
of i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e i n d i c a t o r s are not so much r e s u l t s but r a t h e r a 
proposal f o r a framework i n which a program of research should be car-
r i e d out. The general aim of t h i s program of research i s to expand ex-
i s t i n g formal semantics f o r natural languages l i k e the ones presented 
1 2 3 
f o r instance by Richard Montague, David Lewis or Max Cresswell i n 
order to encompass not only l o c u t i o n a r y i n d i c a t o r s , i . e . t r u t h v a l u e -
r e l e v a n t components of l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s , but a l s o i l l o c u t i o n a r y 
i n d i c a t o r s , i . e . those f e a t u r e s of l i n g u i s t i c expressions which p o i n t 
r a t h e r to how they are to be taken. One of the most important i l l o c u -
t i o n a r y i n d i c a t o r s i s of cöurse sentence mood and so I w i l l i l l u s t r a t e 
my proposal with a fragment of German i n c l u d i n g d e c l a r a t i v e , i n t e r r o g a -
t i v e as well as j u s s i v e sentences. A f u r t h e r type of i l l o c u t i o n a r y i n -
d i c a t o r s , namely p a r t i c l e s , w i l l a l s o be considered i n order t o show 
the i n t e r a c t i o n of d i f f e r e n t kinds of i l l o c u t i o n a r y i n d i c a t o r s . But 
before presenting the r e l e v a n t d a t a , l e t me f i r s t say a few words about 
how I see the connection between a formal theory of i l l o c u t i o n a r y mean-
ing and a theory of language use. 
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1. T h e f r a m e w o r k o f a t h e o r y o f l a n g u a g e u s e 
I assume that normal use of language o r , as I s h a l l say equivalent-
l y , normal l i n g u i s t i c behaviour i s part of r a t i o n a l behaviour, and that 
t h e r e f o r e the c e n t r a l aim of a theory of language use i s to answer the 
f o l l o w i n g question: 
What are the c o n d i t i o n s under which i t i s r a t i o n a l f o r a p o s s i b l e 
Speaker to use a c e r t a i n l i n g u i s t i c expression? 
I t i s widely agreed that language has two basic kinds of uses: a d i a -
l o g i c a l and a monological one o r , as G i l b e r t Harman (1977) puts i t , a 
conmunicative and a c a l c u l a t i v e one. I do not object to Harman's claim 
t h a t "language s u r e l y has both uses, and the second i s as important as 
4 
the f i r s t " , but I do not b e l i e v e t h a t the t h e o r i e s f o r both uses should 
be deyeloped independently nor that a theory of the d i a l o g i c a l use 
should be based on a theory of the monological one. One argument f o r 
f o l l o w i n g the opposite s t r a t e g y comes from the ontogenesis of language: 
no c h i l d w i l l c a l c u l a t e 1 i n g u i s t i c a l l y before having l e a r n e d a language, 
and he learns language through i t s communicative use, even i f what he 
lear n s f i r s t i s to a l a r g e extent a s p e c i a l kind of monologuing. But I 
do not want to dwell f u r t h e r on the d i f f i c u l t t o p i c of how to e x p l a i n 
the monological or c a l c u l a t i v e use of language, and I w i l l r e s t r i c t my 
a t t e n t i o n i n what f o l l o w s to the d i a l o g i c a l one. Then a f i r s t p r e l i m i -
nary answer to our c e n t r a l question can be given as f o l l o w s : 
I t i s r a t i o n a l f o r a p o s s i b l e Speaker to use a c e r t a i n l i n g u i s t i c 
expression E i f he wishes to e n t i t l e a p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t e r to 
draw c e r t a i n inferences from h i s behaviour and i f he b e l i e v e s t h a t 
the use of E i s a good means to t h a t end. 
Among the inferences a p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t e r i s e n t i t l e d to draw from a 
given occurrence of l i n g u i s t i c behaviour are c e r t a i n l y those which 
c o n s t i t u t e what i s c a l l e d a c o r r e c t understanding of the given occur-
5 
rence. Thus, l i k e E. von Savigny, I propose to e x p l a i n l i n g u i s t i c 
behaviour i n terms of a c o r r e c t understanding of t h i s behaviour. But 
what are the inferences which c o n s t i t u t e a c o r r e c t understanding? Ob-
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v i o u s l y not a l l those which are p o s s i b l e . I f I hear someone pronounce 
d i s t i n c t l y "What can I do f o r you?", I can i n f e r e that he has a tongue, 
but t h i s does not belong to the inferences we have i n mind when we are 
t h i n k i n g of c o r r e c t understanding. Why? Because the basis f o r t h i s 
i n f e r e n c e , the f a c t t h a t to have a tongue i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n f o r 
behaving as d e s c r i b e d , i s a law of phys i o l o g y , and not an instance of 
my knowledge of E n g l i s h . What we are a f t e r are inferences of a s p e c i a l 
subclass of those which i n t u i t i v e l y are v a l i d with respect to a given 
occurrence of behaviour. As a f i r s t approximation I propose to d e f i n e 
the subclass i n question as containing e x a c t l y those inferences which 
depend on the assumption that the Speaker knows the language he uses, 
i . e . t h a t he knows what the c o r r e c t inferences are which a p o s s i b l e i n -
t e r p r e t e r i s e n t i t l e d to draw. 
Some t e c h n i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are i n order before we can proceed. 
The normal l o g i c a l means f o r representing a c l a s s of inferences i s a 
sentence: Given a l o g i c a l System which defines a notion of sentence as 
well as a notion of i n f e r e n c e , a c l a s s of inferences with respect to a 
given sentence S can be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the set of those sentences which 
l o g i c a l l y f o l l o w from S. Thus i f we wish to i d e n t i f y c o r r e c t under-
standing with a c l a s s of i n f e r e n c e s , we can c h a r a c t e r i z e i t by a sen-
tence together with a s u i t a b l e notion of i n f e r e n c e . But what i s the 
sentence which determines the c o r r e c t understanding of a given l i n g u i s -
t i c utterance? Is i t the expression which i s uttered? Not every ut-
terance has the form of a sentence, not even an e l l i p t i c a l one (what 
would e.g. "Wow!" be an e l l i p s i s o f ? ) , and those which have are not 
completely understood i f only the expression i s understood, but not 
what the Speaker i s doing i n u t t e r i n g i t . T herefore, I propose to take 
a d e s c r i p t i o n of the l i n g u i s t i c a ct a t the i l l o c u t i o n a r y l e v e l as the 
kind of sentence we are looking f o r . And, knowing w e l l the i n t r i c a c i e s 
of the semantics of natural i l l o c u t i o n - d e s c r i b i n g p r e d i c a t e s , I propose 
f u r t h e r to use a r t i f i c i a l terms f o r the formulation of the i l l o c u t i o n a -
ry d e s c r i p t i o n . If we use a System wi t h i n d i r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n l i k e 
the one defined i n Montague's PTQ,
6
 we have no problem i n doing t h i s 
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sin c e the i n t e n s i o n a l l o g i c i n t o which natural expressions are trans-
l a t e d provides i n f i n i t e l y many constants of each type besides those 
which have natural c o u n t e r p a r t s . Of course, we w i l l have to de f i n e 
those a b s t r a c t c o n s t a n t s , because the c l a s s of inferences we are a f t e r 
w i l l depend on them. But then we w i l l be i n a p o s i t i o n to check the 
adequacy of our theory i n terms of what U. Blau (1978) c a l l s i n t u i t i v e 
correctness and i n t u i t i v e completeness. Our theory w i l l be i n t u i t i v e l y 
c o r r e c t , i f no inference turns out to be f o r m a l l y v a l i d although i n t u i -
t i v e l y i t i s not. I t w i l l be i n t u i t i v e l y complete i f a l l inferences 
which are i n t u i t i v e l y v a l i d are v a l i d i n t h e i r formal r e c o n s t r u c t i o n as 
w e l l . A c c o r d i n g l y , to r e f i n e a theory i s to achieve an in c r e a s i n g de-
gree of completeness w h i l e t r y i n g to keep i n s i d e the f i e l d of c o r r e c t -
ness. But f i r s t we have to de f i n e a notion of entailment on the i l l o -
c u t i o n a r y l e v e l o r , f o r Short, or I I - e n t a i l m e n t . And then we can re-
formulate our answer to the c e n t r a l question i n the f o l l o w i n g d e c i s i o n -
t h e o r e t i c way: 
I t i s r a t i o n a l f o r a p o s s i b l e Speaker to use expression E i n Sit-
uation S i f i t i s optimal f o r him with respect to h i s assumptions 
and preferences to e n t i t l e a p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t e r to draw those 
inferences from h i s behaviour which are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the i l l o -
c u t i onary meaning of E i n S and the notion of I l - e n t a i l m e n t . 
2. E x e m p l i f i o a t i o n 
In the f i r s t part of t h i s chapter, some data from German are pre-
sented which, as f a r as I can see, can only be handled i n an adequate 
way i f not only syntax and semantics proceed hand i n hand, as Montague 
Claims they should,
7
 but syntax, semantics, and pragmatics i n oneof i t s 
senses o r , i n my terms, syntax, l o c u t i o n a r y , and i l l o c u t i o n a r y seman-
t i c s . Then the data are treated f o r m a l l y i n the suggested way, i . e . 
w i t h the help of an i n t e n s i o n a l model-theory and v i a the notion of i l -
l o c u t i o n a r y entailment. 
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2.1 T h e d a t a 
The data are chosen from German with the i n t e n t i o n to show (a) the 
i n t u i t i v e r e l a t i o n s which hold between i l l o c u t i o n s of d i f f e r e n t t y p e , 
but with r e l a t e d content, (b) the i n t e r a c t i o n between ambiguities on the 
l o c u t i o n a r y as w e l l as the i l l o c u t i o n a r y l e v e l , and (c) the i n t e r a c t i o n 
between i l l o c u t i o n a r y i n d i c a t o r s of d i f f e r e n t types. The f o l l o w i n g 
four German sentences w i l l c o n s t i t u t e our m a t e r i a l : 
(1) Wen k e n n t j e d e r ? 
'Whom does everybody know?' 
(2) l o h f r a g e diöh> wen j e d e r k e n n t . 
'I ask you whom everybody knows.' 
(3) Sag m i r > wen j e d e r k e n n t ! 
' T e i l me whom everybody knows!' 
(4) Niemanden k e n n t j e d e r . 
'Nobody i s known by anybody/everybody.
1 
Locutionary ambiguities 
On the l o c u t i o n a r y l e v e l , a l l four sentences are ambiguous with 
respect to the scope of j e d e r . (This i s why (4) has two En g l i s h t r a n -
s l a t i o n s . ) The wide scope reading of (1) can be paraphrased as ( 1 ' ) , 
the narrow scope reading as ( 1 " ) : 
(1') For every person x: whom does x know? 
(1") For which person(s) x: everybody knows x? 
In spoken German (1) i s normally disambiguated by s t r e s s i n g k e n n t i n 
the former and j e d e r i n the l a t t e r case. Note that i n i t s wide scope 
reading, (1) i s equivalent on the l o c u t i o n a r y l e v e l (L-equivalent) with 
the s o - c a l l e d m u l t i p l e question ( 5 ) : 
(5) Wer k e n n t wen? 
'Who knows whom?' 
It f o l l o w s t h a t (5) can a l s o be paraphrased by ( 1 ' ) , and thismeans t h a t 
wer as w e l l as j e d e r can be rendered by the u n i v e r s a l q u a n t i f i e r . I f 
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we apply the same procedure to wen, we get ( l
, n
) , 
(1'") For every person x and every person y: does x know y? 
which i s a l s o a good paraphrase of the r e l e v a n t L-reading of (1) and 
where no i n t e r r o g a t i v e pronoun occurs at a l l . This i s one of the f a c t s 
on which my treatment of WH-questions w i l l be based. 
Exa c t l y the same scope ambiguity a r i s e s with respect to the i n d i -
r e c t question clauses wen j e d e r k e n n t i n (2) and ( 3 ) , and (4) i s ambi-
guous i n an analogous way: i t s wide scope reading can be paraphrased as 
(4
1
) and i t s narrow scope reading as ( 4
n
) : 
(4') For every person x: x knows nobody. 
(4") For no person x: everybody knows x. 
I l l o c u t i o n a r y ambiguities 
On the i l l o c u t i o n a r y l e v e l we s h a l l focus on two uses of i n t e r r o -
g 
g a t i v e sentences, namely the e r o t e t i c and the a s s e r t i v e ones. The 
e r o t e t i c I l - r e a d i n g of (1) aims at an answer regarding e i t h e r those 
persons who are known by everybody or those p a i r s of persons <x,y> such 
t h a t x knows y , according to which L-reading i s chosen. The a s s e r t i v e 
I l - r e a d i n g of ( 1 ) , on the other hand, i s a more s t y l i s h way of express-
Q 
ing the b e l i e f that nobody (or almost nobody) i s known by everybody 
o r , much s t r o n g e r , by anybody, again according to the L-reading under 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . In German WH-interrogatives, t h i s II-ambiguity i s o f t e n 
removed by intr o d u c i n g the p a r t i c l e s c h o n (not to be confused with the 
adverb s c h o n 'already') i f the a s s e r t i v e reading i s meant. At the same 
time, the L-ambiguity i s removed as well s i n c e , at l e a s t according to 
my i n t u i t i o n s , (6) has only the wide scope and (7) only the narrow 
scope r e a d i n g .
1 0 
(6) Wen k e n n t j e d e r s c h o n ? 
(7) Wen k e n n t s c h o n j e d e r ? 
This f i t s i n with our Observation t h a t i n spoken German the main s t r e s s 
i s on k e n n t f o r the wide scope reading and on j e d e r i n the narrow scope 
case s i n c e , as Krivonosov (1965) has pointed o u t , only unstressed e l e -
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ments can occur between the main verb and a modal p a r t i c l e . 
Sentences (2) and (4) are d e c l a r a t i v e sentences. In g e n e r a l , de-
c l a r a t i v e sentences have at l e a s t two I l - r e a d i n g s , an a s s e r t i v e and a 
d e c l a r a t i o n a l one. The a s s e r t i v e use of a sentenceScommits the Speak-
er i n some way to the b e l i e f t h a t S i s t r u e w h i l e the d e c l a r a t i o n a l use 
of S makes S t r u e . According to a proposal made by I . Heim (1977), 
which I s h a l l adopt here, Austin's (1962) s o - c a l l e d e x p l i c i t performa-
t i v e utterances are a s p e c i a l case of d e c l a r a t i o n s . So the i n t e r e s t i n g 
I l - r e a d i n g o f (2) i s the e x p l i c i t performative or the d e c l a r a t i o n a l 
one. On the other hand, with respect to (4) only the a s s e r t i v e reading 
w i l l be c onsidered. ( I t seems hard indeed to imagine a S i t u a t i o n where 
(4) can be i n t e r p r e t e d as a d e c l a r a t i o n . ) 
(3) i s a j u s s i v e sentence, and here only the d i r e c t i v e use 
w i l l be c onsidered. 
I l l o c u t i o n a r y r e l a t i o n s between (1) - (4) 
When confronted w i t h sentences (1) - ( 4 ) , every n a t i v e Speaker of 
German w i l l f e e l t h a t there are strong i n t u i t i v e r e l a t i o n s holding be-
tween them. These r e l a t i o n s , however, are not l o c u t i o n a r y or semantic-
a l i n nature (as D. Lewis (1970: 205-212) f a l s e l y C l a i m s ) ,
1 1
 but they 
are i l l o c u t i o n a r y r e l a t i o n s , s i n c e they vary according to the I l - r e a d -
ing under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . My Claim i s that the r e l a t i o n s which hold be-
tween (1) - ( 4 ) , and which c o n s t i t u t e data to be accounted f o r , are the 
f o l l o w i n g : 
The L-readings of the e r o t e t i c reading of (1) are I l - e n t a i l e d by 
the corresponding L-readings of the d e c l a r a t i o n a l reading of (2) 
and by the corresponding L- readings of ( 3 ) , The L-readings of the 
a s s e r t i v e reading of ( 1 ) , on the other hand, are I l - e q u i v a l e n t 
w i t h the corresponding readings of (the a s s e r t i v e reading of) ( 4 ) . 
2.2 A f o r m a l t r e a t m e n t o f t h e d a t a 
2.2.0 O u t l i n e 
My proposal f o r a treatment of the above-mentioned data r e s t s on 
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the assumptions put forward i n Montague (1974b), namely that a formal 
grammar ( i n the sense of syntax a n d semantics) of some language L has 
to d e f i n e not only the notion of a sentence of L, but a l s o a correspond-
ing disambiguated language L' which provides a s y n t a c t i c counterpart 
f o r each reading of a L-sentence. Here, c e r t a i n a b s t r a c t elements l i k e 
parentheses and i n d i c e s are introduced which do not occur i n L. Fur-
thermore, i t has to assign each L'-sentence i t s meaning ( i n t e n s i o n ) 
w i t h respect to an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and i t s denotation (extension) w i t h 
respect to a model, i . e . an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n together with a point of 
re f e r e n c e . For the sake of p e r s p i c u i t y , Montague uses i n PTQ a second 
a r t i f i c i a l language L" i n t o which L
1
 - expressions have t o b e t r a n s l a t e d 
before the meaning-assignment can apply. In the f o l l o w i n g , I s h a l l a-
dopt t h i s procedure as wel l as the i n t e n s i o n a l l o g i c which plays i n PTQ 
the r o l e of L \ 
2.2.1 S y n t a x 
I w i l l f i r s t c h a r a c t e r i z e the disambiguated language DG (disambi-
guated German) i n which the above-mentioned readings of (1) - (4) w i l l 
be represented. 
Categories of DG 





 e C a t (n e N ) ,
1 2 
( i i ) i f A, B e C a t , then A^B e C a t (n e IN). 
I f n = 0, i t w i l l u s u a l l y be omitted. e i s to be understood as the 
category of e n t i t y e x p r e s s i o n s , t
n
 as the categories of t r u t h - v a l u e -
denoting expressions or sentence r a d i c a l s and f
n
 as the categories of 
f o r c e c a r r y i n g expressions or sentences. As i n d i c a t e d above, the d i s -
t i n c t i o n between the l o c u t i o n a r y and the i l l o c u t i o n a r y l e v e l i s r e f l e c t -






Categories of some basic expressions of DG 
Ab b r e v i a t i o n : IV := (e/t) 
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{ i c h , du, j e d e r , niemand, e r ^ , e r ^ , . . . } Q By := B-^jy 































 i s the set of basic expres-
sions of category A, and P
A
 the set of phrases of t h i s category. For 
mnemonic reasons, I w i l l use the f o l l o w i n g a b b r e v i a t i o n s : P
D e c
- P f l are 
the d e c l a r a t i o n a l , P ß
s s












 t n e
 d i r e c t i v e DG-sentences. 
The language of i n t e n s i o n a l l o g i c IL 
As t a r g e t language of the t r a n s l a t i o n procedure to be s p e c i f i e d 
below, I take the typed i n t e n s i o n a l tense l o g i c defined i n Montague 
(1974c: 2 5 6 f . ) , w i t h i t s d e f i n i t i o n s of types and of meaningful expres-
sions of each type. I a l s o adopt the n o t a t i o n a l Convention of design-
a t i n g those IL-constants which are t a r g e t expressions of the t r a n s l a t i o n 
procedure by primed v a r i a n t s of the corresponding DG-expressions, and 
of marking the extensional counterparts of IL- p r e d i c a t e s by a s u b s t a r . 
13 
T r a n s l a t i o n s of the r e l e v a n t b a s i c DG-expressions 
i c h t r a n s l a t e s i n t o sp* 
du " " ad* 
j e d e r " " PAx[Pers(x) P{x}] 
Pivx[Pers(x)„ P{x}] n i e m a n d 










pAx[Pers(x) + P{x}] 
kenn' 
f r a g ' 
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The r e l e v a n t r u l e s of syntax and t r a n s l a t i o n 
The form of a s y n t a c t i c a l r u l e i s the f o l l o w i n g : l e t A, B, C be 
any c a t e g o r i e s . I f a e P A and 3 e P ß , then Y e P C > where y i s t h e value 
of some Operation F f o r the arguments a and 3. 3 can be z e r o . The 
form of the corresponding t r a n s l a t i o n r u l e i s as f o l l o w s : Let A, B, C 
be as above. I f a e P ^ , a t r a n s l a t e s i n t o a
l
, 3 e P ß , and 3 t r a n s l a t e s 
i n t o 3 1 » then y (y e P Q , y = F(a,ß)) t r a n s l a t e s i n t o Y'> where y
l
 i s 
the value of some Operation F' f o r the arguments a' and 3 ' . I w i l l 
combine both forms i n t o the f o l l o w i n g r u l e scheme: 
a e P A 
3 e P ß 3' 
Y e P C ~ 
The types of the t a r g e t expressions are determined by the f o l l o w i n g 
r u l e : every DG-phrase of category A t r a n s l a t e s i n t o a meaningful IL-ex-
p r e s s i o n of type k(A) where k, the category-to-type mapping, i s that 
f u n c t i o n from C a t i n t o the set of types such that (1) k(e) = e, k ( t
n
) 
= k ( f
n
) = t f o r a l l n e W, and ( i i ) k(A/^) = « s , k ( B ) > , k(A)> f o r a l l 
n e u . 
R 1 O b j e e t embedding 
For any A e C a t , n e {3, 4} 
a e P T a' 
ß
 « p
A / n T
 0> 
a" ß e P A ß'(-o') 
R 2 I n d i r e a t q u e s t i o n c l a u s e embedding 
ß e P T ß' 
a,ob ß
+
 e P N , a'("ß') 
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where 3 + comes from 3 by r e p l a c i n g a l l occurrences of ( i ) y °
n
 by 
the n person i n c h o a t i v e present tense of y> ( ü ) ö by the 
t h i r d case of 6, and ( i i i ) n 4 by the f o u r t h case of n . 1 4 





a 3 a ' ( A 3 ' ) 
where 3 comes from 3 by r e p l a c i n g a l l upper i n d i c e s 0 i n 3 by o l 
i f a = i c h , o2 i f a = du, and o3 otherwise. 
R 4/R 5 D e c l a r a t i v e s e n t e n c e s w i t h a s s e r t i v e a n d d e c l a r a t i o n a l 




a 3 Y 5 n 
where 
3 
Y 5 n 
n e {1,2,3} and 3 , 















 n . )
M 
( 4 B on 6 a 3 y n . ) u 
e P , where CD e {Ass, 
10
 t h 
Dec}, on. i s the n 0 
person i n d i c a t i v e 
present tense of 6, 
and 3 , 4
0
 are the 
Y 3 
t h i r d and f o u r t h 
case of Y and 3, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
R 6 I n t e r r o g a t i v e s e n t e n c e s w i t h e r o t e t i c f o r c e 
A 3
 x
on „ 1 
a 3 Y < 5 n e P
t
 OL 









E r o 





ad*, Aa') i f 
o) = Ass, 







R 7 I n t e r r o g a t i v e s e n t e n c e s w i t h a s s e r t i v e f o r c e 
o 3 ° n y e P
t
l a 
where n e {1.2.3} 
(o on
ß









 i s the n
t h
 person i n d i c a t i v e present tense of ß and y
+ 
comes from y by r e p l a c i n g a l l items w i t h upper i n d i c e s 3 or 4 i n 
Y by t h e i r t h i r d or f o u r t h case, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
R 8 J u s s i v e s e n t e n c e s 
a ß Y ö n e a 










where Imp^ i s the imperative form of 6 and 3 , 4^ are as above. 
R 9,n Q u a n t i f y i n g i n 











 ß 1 
MYXi e P , a'(X
n
B') 
where ß[Y n/a^] comes from ß by r e p l a c i n g the f i r s t occurrence of an 
item with lower index n by the corresponding case of a wi t h lower 
index n. 





ß c P ^ ß' 
ß e P^m, where e i t h e r a'(x ß
1
) 
(a) there i s an occurrence of o b i n ß and ß + comes from ß by 
d e l e t i n g the f i r s t item with lower index n i n ß and by r e p l a c i n g 
o b by the corresponding case of a , or (b) there i s an occurrence 
of an element of P Q
T
 i n ß and ß +=ß[Y
n
/o^], the l a t t e r being de-
ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE INDICATORS 791 
f i n e d as i n R 9 , n , or (c) there i s no occurrence of o b or an e l e -
ment of Pgy i n 3 and ß + comes from 3 by d e l e t i n g the f i r s t item 
w i t h lower index n i n 3 and by p r e f i x i n g 3 w i t h the corresponding 
case of a. 
R H P s e u d o - q u e s t i o n - t e r m s 
PQT Q a ' ( y n Q t y } ) 
R 12,n P s e u d o - t e r m - q u e s t i o n s 
a e P
r 
3 y <S 
POT 
where m e {1,2,3}, and 6 may be empty 
a y 3 ö c P t l a'(x
n
S') 
where 3 comes from 3 by d e l e t i n g the f i r s t occurrence of an item 
w i t h lower index n i n 3 and a
+
 i s the corresponding case of a. 
The working of these r u l e s can be demonstrated i n a familiär way w i t h 
the help of a n a l y s i s t r e e s . The number of the r u l e i n Operation i s 
added t o the r i g h t of the Output e x p r e s s i o n , furthermore, the category 
of each expression i s i n d i c a t e d i n s i d e a c i r c l e . 
Two sample a n a l y s i s t r e e s : 
( l a
1
) (wen k e n n t j e d e r ^ ?)
 E r Q
 ^ 3 ) , 
j e d e r © 
w e r © 




( k e n n t e r
Q




9 , 0 







 e n n
 ( t ) ' 
e r j k e n n 




) (sag m i r , wen j e d e r
Q
 k e n n t ! 
j e d e r 
w e r 
(sag m i r , wen e r k e n n t 
^ Q J ^ (sag m i r , o b e r
Q
 i h n ^ k e n n t ! ^ 





ihn* k e n n t 
© 
i c h ? sag", o b e r
Q
 i h n ^ k e n n t , 
i a h s a g 
i c h 
, 1 e r
Q




Representation of the r e l e v a n t readings of ( l ) - ( 4 ) i n DG: 
The two sample a n a l y s i s trees should have made c l e a r how to derive 
the f o l l o w i n g ten sentences, which are the DG-representation of the 
readings mentioned under 2.1 above. 




( l b ) (wen k e n n t j e d e r ? ) ^
Q 
( l c ) (wen k e n n t j e d e r ^ ?^
Ass 
( l d ) (wen k e n n t J e d e r ? ) ^ 
(2a) (ich f r a g e d i c h , wen j e d e r
Q
 k e n n t . 
(2b) (ich f r a g e d i c h , wen j e d e r k e n n t . J p
e c 
(3a) (sag m i r , wen j e d e r k e n n t ! 1 ^ . ^ 
(3b) (sag m i r , wen j e d e r k e n n t ! ) ^ . ^ 
(4a) ( n i e m a n d e n k e n n t j e d e r . ) ^ 
(4b) ( n i e m a n d e n ^ k e n n t j e d e r . ) ^
s s 
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The ambiguation r e l a t i o n AR: 
AR i s to be the s m a l l e s t r e l a t i o n such that «*,<*'> e AR i f and on-
l y i f a e P^n f o r some n e N and a' comes from a by c a p i t a l i z i n g the 
f i r s t l e t t e r and d e l e t i n g a l l parentheses and i n d i c e s i n a. The ränge 
of AR i s c a l l e d S or the set of G-sentences, where G i s the ambiguous 
counterpart of DG. I t i s easy to see t h a t ( l ) - ( 4 ) are elements of S 
according to t h i s d e f i n i t i o n . 
Representation i n IL 
The a p p l i c a t i o n of the t r a n s l a t i o n part of our r u l e s leads to ex-
pressions which are equivalent w i t h the f o l l o w i n g IL-formulas ( l a
u
) -
( 4 b " ) .
1 5
 A b b r e v i a t i o n s : i f a i s a formula, then ER0(
A
a) := E r o (
A
s p , 
A
a d * ,
A
a ) , ASS(
A




a d * ,
A
a ) , and DIR(
A




a d * ,
A
a ) . 
( l a " ) Au[Pers*(u) + Av[Pers*(v) -> ERO(
A
kenn^(u,v))]] 
( l b " ) Av[Pers*(v) •> ERO(
A
Au[Pers*(u) •+ feenni(u,v)])] 
( l c " ) ASS(
A





-,Vv[Pers*(v)&Au[Pers*(u) -> fcenrc;(u,v)]]) 
(2a
M




a d * ,
A
k e n < ( u , v ) ) ] ] 
(2b
n








Au[Pers*(u) + kenn;(u,v)])] 
(3a") 























Au[Pers*(u) k e n n ^ ( u
9
\ f ) ] ) ) ] 
(4a") ASS(
A
Au[Pers*(u) •* -,Vv[Pers*(v)&/cenni(u,v)]]) 
(4b") ASS(
A
-,Vv[Pers*(v)&Au[Pers*(u) + kenn±{u,v)]}) 
2.2.2 S e m a n t i c s 
An I L - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l l y an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n the sense 
of Montague's PTQ-logic ( l o c . c i t . p. 258), i . e . a quintuple <E,W,T,<, 
F>, where E,W,T are nonempty sets (to be understood as the sets of 
e n t i t i e s , p o s s i b l e worlds and moments of time, r e s p e c t i v e l y ) , < i s a 
l i n e a r ordering on T and f o r every i e I , F ( i ) i s a f u n c t i o n which maps 
the constants of each type i n t o the set of p o s s i b l e denotations of t h a t 
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type; I , the set of i n d i c e s , i s defined as E x E x W x T. Therefore, 
f o r each i e I , the f i r s t and second coordinate of i are i n d i v i d u a l s 
and may serve i n every i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as the i-extensions of the spe-
c i a l expressions 'sp' ( f o r Speaker) and 'ad' ( f o r addressee). Of 
course, not a l l p o s s i b l e I L - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s w i l l be i n t e r e s t i n g f o r the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of German. With the help of some meaning p o s t u l a t e s , I 
w i l l t h e r e f o r e c h a r a c t e r i z e a more r e s t r i c t e d notion of I L - i n t e r p r e t a -
t i o n which I w i l l c a l l G - I L - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i n t e n s i -
onal l o g i c admissible f o r the a n a l y s i s of German) and on which my cen-
t r a l d e f i n i t i o n s of t r u t h and entailment w i l l be based. 
Meaning postulates 
I t would be the task of an e x p l i c i t theory of morphological mean-
ing to d e f i n e the a b s t r a c t constant 'Pers', and of a theory of speech 
acts to d e f i n e the a b s t r a c t constants 'Ero', 'Ass
1
, and ' D i r ' . In t h i s 
paper, however, two of them are only p a r t i a l l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d , s i n c e f o r 
the present purposes, even the f i r s t two meaning postulates w i l l do. 
The n , i , g-extensions of the f o l l o w i n g formulas are to be 1 f o r 
a l l G - I L - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s n , a l l n - i n d i c e s i and a l l n- assignments g: 
MP 1 AxAfAp[Ero(x,f,p) + - > f r a g ' { x , V
9





'(y,ßP{x},p)) -> Ero(x,ßP{y},p)] 
MP 3 AxAPAp[6(x,P,p) -* A s s ( x , P , p ) ] , where 6 e {behaupV, m i t t e i l
1
, 
f e s t s t e l V } . ('assert', 'communicate', 'state') 
MP 4 AXAPAp[6(x,P,p) •> D i r ( x , P , p ) ] , where 6 e { a u f f o r d e r t b i t t
x
 , 
b e f e h V } . ('ask', 'request', 'order') 
T r u t h , l o c u t i o n a r y , and i l l o c u t i o n a r y entailment 
Let a , 3 be elements of P^n, f o r some n e W. 
(1) T r u t h - i n - a - m o d e l . Let n be a G - I L - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and i an 











= 1 f o r a l l n- assignments g. (Thus, the notion of t r u t h i s only de-
f i n e d with respect to sentences with d e c l a r a t i o n a l or a s s e r t i v e f o r c e , 
but not with respect to e r o t e t i c or d i r e c t i v e sentences.) 
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(2) a L - e n t a i l s 3 i f and only i f f o r a l l G - I L - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s n and 
a l l n - i n d i c e s i , a i s tr u e i n n at i only i f 3 i s tr u e i n n at i . 
N o t a t i o n : a =^ => 3. 
(3) a I l - e n t a i l s 3 i f and only i f f o r a l l G - I L - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s n , a l l 






 = 1 only i f 3' n * 1 ' 9 
= 1, where a* and 3' are the t r a n s l a t i o n s of a and 3, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
N o t a t i o n : a =ü=> 3. 
2.3 R e s u l t s 
The r e s u l t s of our formal treatment of i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e i n d i c a -
t o r s i n an i l l u s t r a t i v e fragment of German are a formal r e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
of the f a c t s s t a t e d at the end of chapter 2.1; the only d i f f e r e n c e , a 
mutual entailment i n the f i r s t two cases instead of a simple one, i s 
due to the r a t h e r u n i n t e r e s t i n g f a c t t h a t our small fragment n e i t h e r 
treats plural, nor i n d i c e s with more than one Speaker or addressee, nor 
the d i f f e r e n c e between d u and s i e . Here are the r e s u l t s : 
( 2 a ) <=U^ ( l a ) <lc) <-U-> (4a) 
(2b) <iU ( l b ) ( l d ) <^> (4b) 




3. D i s o u s s i o n 
In t h i s t h i r d part of my paper, I w i l l open the d i s c u s s i o n myself 
and give some p r e l i m i n a r y r e p l i e s to several o b j e c t i o n s that might be 
r a i s e d a g a i n s t my proposal f o r a formal treatment of i l l o c u t i o n a r y 
f o r c e i n d i c a t o r s . 
O b j e o t i o n 1: Isn't t h a t another attempt to reduce pragmatics ( i n the 
sense of a theory of language use) to semantics? 
R e p l y l: Yes and no. Yes i n the r a t h e r t r i v i a l sense that every occur-
rence of language use can be d e s c r i b e d , and the semantics of t h i s de-
s c r i p t i o n can be s t u d i e d . But t h i s i s probably not what you mean. No 
i n the sense t h a t I do not i d e n t i f y the r u l e f o r the use of a l i n g u i s t -
i c expression with e i t h e r the l o c u t i o n a r y or the i l l o c u t i o n a r y meaning 
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of t h i s e x p r e s s i o n , r a t h e r I regard the l o c u t i o n a r y meaning as p a r t l y 
determining the i l l o c u t i o n a r y meaning and the l a t t e r as the c e n t r a l no-
t i o n i n the r u l e f o r the use of the expression under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
O b j e c t i o n 2: You propose to d i s t i n g u i s h between a r a t h e r small number 
of i l l o c u t i o n a r y types. Why not j u s t t h r e e , corresponding to the three 
main sentence moods o r , with Wittgenstein (1958: §23) i n f i n i t e l y many? 
R e p l y 2: As f o r the f i r s t part of your counterproposal, I hope my ex-
amples have already shown that there i s no one-to-one correspondence 
between sentence mood and i l l o c u t i o n a r y t y p e , at l e a s t i n German or 
E n g l i s h . I do not deny that p o s s i b l y there are natural languages which 
have unambiguous s y n t a c t i c devices f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between i l l o c u -
t i o n a r y t y p e s . As f o r the second p a r t , I would say: " I l l o c u t i o n e s non 
sunt t n u l t i p l i c a n d a e praeter necessitatem." - i f we get by with the as-
sumptien of a r a t h e r small stock of i l l o c u t i o n a r y t y p e s , we should 
avoid an i n f l a t i o n of t h i s s t o c k. Of course you can think of a c o n t i -
nuous t r a n s i t i o n between e.g. the e r o t e t i c and the a s s e r t i v e use of i n -
t e r r o g a t i v e sentences, but the German language f o r instance draws a 
Sharp l i n e between them by p e r m i t t i n g or f o r b i d d i n g the occurrence of 
the p a r t i c l e schon. 
O b j e c t i o n 3: On the l e v e l of l o c u t i o n a r y semantics we t r y to d i s t i n -
g u i s h as sharply as p o s s i b l e between vagueness and ambiguity. Your 
proposal amounts to the Claim that primary performative sentences are 
ambiguous on the i l l o c u t i o n a r y l e v e l . To me i t seems more appealing to 
suppose t h a t they are j u s t vague. 
R e p l y 3: You are r i g h t that I c l a i m primary performative sentences to 
be Il-ambiguous; l e t me add that I do not exclude e x p l i c i t performative 
formulas from that c l a i m . Concerning your vagueness p r o p o s a l , I have 
no r e a l knock-down argument against i t , but I t h i n k the f o l l o w i n g data 
c o n s t i t u t e at l e a s t some evidence against the assumption that f o r i n -
stance German d e c l a r a t i v e sentences are j u s t vague with respect to the 
d e c l a r a t i o n a l or a s s e r t i v e f o r c e they can have. I suppose you agree 
t h a t the reference of i n d e x i c a l s can be vague as well as ambiguous, and 
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that e.g. 'he', used in a Situation where the Speaker i s pointing at 
two persons, i s rather ambiguous than vague. Now imagine the following 
Situation: A, while saying ( 8 ) , gives a l e t t e r to B. 
(8) H i e r m i t t e i l e i c h I h n e n m i t , da$ Ihr G o l d f i s c h v e r s t o r b e n i s t . 
'I hereby inform you of the death of your goldfish.' 
h i e r m i t ('hereby') contains an indexical element which, in the given 
Situation, may refer either to the utterance or to the letter. I hope 
you concede a l s o that i n t h i s case h i e r m i t i s rather ambiguous than 
vague. But now look at the illocutionary force of ( 8 ) ! I f h i e r m i t i s 
interpreted in the first way, then an utterance of (8) constitutes a 
declaration and the truth of (.8) depends among other things on the 
question whether it i s uttered or not. I f i t i s uttered, as supposed, 
and if a l l happiness conditions o b t a i n , then (8) i s clearly true. I f , 
however, h i e r m i t i s taken i n the second way, then an utterance of (8) 
constitutes an assertion and the truth of (8) depends on what the l e t -
ter says. I f i t says, for i n s t a n c e , that the addressee's g o l d f i s h i s 
s t i l l alive, then (8) i s clearly false. So we have two clear-cut 
cases: The declarational one w i t h truth of ( 8 ) , and the a s s e r t i v e 
one with f a l s i t y of ( 8 ) , and there i s no continuous transition between 
the two and hence nothing which supports the vagueness c l a i m and every-
thing which supports the ambiguity claim. 
O b j e c t i o n 4 ... No, now it i s your turn! 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Montague (1974a, b, c). 
2. Lewis (1972). 
3. Cresswell (1973). 
4. Harman (1977: 418). 
5. von Savigny (1974, ch. 7). 
6. This i s the commonly used abbreviation for Montague (1974c). 
7. Montague (1974a:210). 
8. The latter i s also known as rhetorical question. 
9. In ordinary language, expressions like 'everybody* are often used 





10. I am not entirely sure whether (7) has not s t i l l both readings, 
which can be separated in spoken German by stressing either k e n n t or 
j e d e r . 
11. For a critique of his position cf. Zaefferer (1981). 
12. Isl is the usual notation for the set of natural numbers (including 
zero). 
13. For the details of the IL-expressions such as variable-names, arc-
and upstar-convention cf. Montague (1974c:260). 
14. For those readers who are not familiär with German morphology, the 
relevant forms of our fragment are the following: 
i c h d u j e d e r n i e m a n d e r ^ w e r 
third case m i r d i r j e d e m niemandem ^^
tm
n
 w e m 
fourth case m i c h d i c h j e d e n niemanden i h n ^ wen 
15. For the equivalence proofs, i t is profitable to use the PTQ-prin-
ciples stated in Link (1979: 179ff., 220). 
